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]WASHINGTON CASE LAW
act of a public officer committed in the performance of his official
duties. Kilcup v. McManus was cited as controlling, and the dictum of
Kilcup became the holding in Brink.
CONTRACTS
Property-Evidence-Oral Contracts to Devise. Nearly twenty
years after it was announced, the Washington court has amplified an
announced intention to enforce stringent technical rules in its consid-
eration of oral contracts to devise. In an action for specific perform-
ance of his deceased employer's alleged oral contract to devise realty,
plaintiff presented an uncontroverted line of evidence dating from 1937.
At that time plaintiff was a friend and neighbor of decedent and her
husband, and was employed as a logger at a wage of $5.60 per day.
Shortly after the husband's death, plaintiff left his logging job and com-
menced operation of decedent's farm for $1.50 per day plus board and
room. Three months later his wages were reduced to $.50 per day, and
remained at that figure until mortgages on the property were satisfied
in 1942. The wage of $1.50 per day was then reinstated and continued
19 years. During this 24 year period, plaintiff took only one vacation
"that amounted to anything";I the rest of his time was spent working
on decedent's property. Plaintiff, at his own expense, erected perma-
nent farm buildings in 1949 and 1958 on decedent's property rather
than on his own adjoining property. "A considerable time" prior to her
death in 1961, decedent made out a holographic will devising her farm
to plaintiff, but failed to sign it. Nine neighbors of decedent gave un-
disputed testimony of her intention to devise the farm to plaintiff. A
neighbor who contacted decedent about acquiring a right of way across
her property was referred to plaintiff to see if he would agree. How-
ever, no witness was able to testify as to the existence of an express
contract between plaintiff and decedent. The trial court decreed spe-
cific performance and defendant administrator appealed. Held: Fol-
lowing death of the alleged promisor, circumstantial evidence is not
sufficient to establish an oral contract to devise. Bicknell v. Guenther,
65 Wash. Dec.2d 726, 399 P.2d 598 (1965).
The facts in the principal case, while failing to establish by direct
evidence the existence of an oral contract, leave little doubt that one
did exist. Plaintiff's uncontroverted circumstantial evidence was con-
' E.g., Jennings v. D'Hooghe, 25 Wn2d 702, 172 P2d 189 (1946) ; Resor v. Schaefer,
193 Wash. 91, 74 P.2d 917 (1937).
2' Biclell v. Guenther, 65 Wash. Dec2d 726, 730, 399 P.2d 598, 601 (1965).
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sistent with the alleged contract terms. No evidence or suggestion of
fraud was offered by defendant. The trial court found in its oral
decision that "the evidence overwhelmingly supports the Plaintiff's
contention that there is a contract .... I Reversing the trial court, a
majority of the Washington Supreme Court found that the uncontra-
dicted circumstantial evidence offered was not necessarily insufficient
to prove the existence of the contract, but was insufficient to prove its
existence "beyond legitimate controversy.""
The policy underlying the Washington court's decision in the princi-
pal case is concern for potential fraudulent claims against a decedent's
estate.' Circumstantial evidence which would support an allegation
of the existence of an oral contract to devise may often exist, even
though no contract is in fact made. The court has therefore adopted a
"skeptical view of such agreements."' Little weight is accorded the
trial court's findings on review, and the equivalent of de novo examina-
tion of the evidence is undertaken by the supreme court.
Judge Finley's dissenting opinion challenges the majority's require-
ment that oral contracts to devise be proved "beyond legitimate contro-
versy." He would require, instead, that oral contracts to devise be
proved by "clear, cogent and convincing" evidence. The cases cited
by Judge Finley in his criticism of the majority's standard of proof
suggest that he would test the existence of an alleged oral contract
to devise by the standards applied to other implied contracts.'
Judge Finley's opinion did not discuss the majority's concern with
potential fraud. He presented an opposing policy consideration-the
social utility of the oral contract to devise for people of modest means
who act without advice of counsel.' Judge Finley's position was that:
A contract to make a will is an equitable doctrine, designed to overcome
sId. at 731, 399 P.2d at 601.
'65 Wash. Dec2d at 738, 399 P.2d at 605.5 Id. at 736-37, 399 P.2d at 604-05; See also Payn v. Hoge, 21 Wn.2d 32, 40, 149 P2d
939, 944 (1944). SPARKS, CONTRACTS To MAKE WILLS 24-26 (1956).
6 65 Wash. Dec2d at 732, 399 P2d at 602. This skepticism is exemplified by the
majority's statement that: "In the absence of the requisite proof of the existence of
a contract to devise the farm to him, neither law nor equity can now make such a
contract for the parties, no matter how strongly the court may feel that as an abstract
concept of natural justice he should have been given the farm and contents." 65 Wash.
Dec2d at 734, 399 P.2d at 603.
7 Of ten cases cited, only one involved an oral contract to devise arising after the
death of the promisor. Judge Finley relies primarily on the opinion of Judge Steinert in
Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wn2d 128, 201 P.2d 129 (1948), a typical case of implied contract.
Cf. the opinion by Judge Steinert in Resor v. Schaefer, 193 Wash. 91, 74 P.2d 917
(1937). Judge Hamilton also dissented in a brief opinion stating his concurrence with
the views of Judge Finley and specifically objecting to the majority's dismissal of the
trial court's findings of fact.
8 Cf., SPARKs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 187-200.
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the legalistic requirements of the law dealing with commercial contracts
and wills. It is not inconceivable to me that the law could formulate a
slightly different type of contract, at least proof of it, to cover this social
problem; in fact, I think it is the duty of the law to recognize and give
effect to these arrangements. 9
The court's decision in the principal case is consistent with its earlier
holdings. Beginning in the late 1930's, the court reversed its prior
liberal approach to the question of oral contracts to devise.10 The deci-
sion in the principal case has polarized the conflicting viewpoints in
the court as to the validity of the present approach.
CRIMINAL LAW
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Admissibility of Evi-
dence Incident to Arrest. Defendant was riding as a guest in a car
when Seattle police stopped the car and arrested the driver for twice
turning without signaling and for failure to produce a valid driver's
license. Defendant and the other passengers in the automobile were
also arrested and taken to jail. The car was impounded. A search of
the car the next day, accomplished without a search warrant, disclosed
two revolvers hidden under the dash. At defendant's subsequent trial
on robbery charges, the revolvers were admitted in evidence despite
defendant's motion to suppress and objection. The trial court ruled
that, although defendant's arrest was unlawful, he had no standing to
claim the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures. On
appeal from defendant's conviction, held: A search of an impounded
car without a warrant, conducted one day after an arrest, is not incident
to the arrest, and evidence so obtained is inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution of a passenger in the car. State v. Riggins, 64 Wn.2d 897,
395 P.2d 85 (1964).
The Washington court, long before the Supreme Court's historic de-
cision in Mapp v. Ohio,' indicated approval of the federal "exclusionary
rule."2 This rule declares that evidence obtained by an unlawful search
9 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 743, 399 P.2d at 608.
3
0 See, e.g., Resor v. Schaefer, 193 Wash. 91, 74 P2d 917 (1937) ; Payn v. Hoge, 21
Wn2d 32, 149 P2d 939 (1944) ; Jennings v. D'Hooghe, 25 Wn.2d 702, 172 P2d 189(1946). As late as 1939, however, a student writer was able to state that "The Wash-
ington Court has, heretofore, been liberal in finding a contract to devise when orally
made." Comment, 14 WAsHr. L. REv. 30, 34 (1939). See Shattuck, Contracts in Wash-
ington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsr. L. REv. 24, 503-05 (1959).
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 See State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash. 528, 63 P.2d 376 (1936), and cases cited therein;
Comment, The Washington Law of Arrest Without Warrant-Incidental Search, 36
WAsr. L. Ray. 501, 510-11 (1961).
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